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The syntax of concessive clauses: evidence from exempt anaphora
Gunnar Lund and Isabelle Charnavel∗
1 Introduction
Concessive clauses—adverbial clauses headed by even though and although in English—are under-
studied constructions semantically and syntactically. Charnavel (2019b) offers a new tool in diag-
nosing the syntax of adjunct clauses: the distribution of exempt anaphora. We apply this diagnostic
to English concessive clauses. In conjunction with other syntactic tests, we explore the syntactic
properties of even though-clauses and provide a higher resolution syntax for these constructions.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the diagnostic introduced in Char-
navel (2019b). In Section 3, we put the empirical claims in Charnavel (2019b) to the test experi-
mentally. We then extend the analysis to concessive clauses in Section 4. We apply further syntactic
tests to even though-clauses in Section 5. We provide a syntactic analysis of these clauses in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
The classic formulation of Condition A states that an anaphor must be bound in its binding domain,
which for our purposes can be approximated to the smallest clause containing it (see Charnavel and
Sportiche (2016) for detailed discussion). In (1a), the anaphor itself is within the binding domain
for its antecedent the moon, and as such, satisfies Condition A. In (1b), Condition A is not satisfied;
itself is outside of the binding domain of its antecedent the moon.
(1) (Adapted from Charnavel and Sportiche (2016))
a. The mooni spins on itselfi.
b. *The mooni influences people [who are sensitive to itselfi].
However, as has long been noticed, reflexive anaphors like herself also show apparent exemp-
tion from Condition A in certain contexts (Ross 1970, Pollard and Sag 1992, Reinhart and Reuland
1993, i.a.). In (2a), the anaphor herself is not c-commanded by Mary, its antecedent. In (2b), the
anaphor himself is not in the local domain of Albert. The contexts that license such exemption are
argued to be those that in some sense represent the perspective of their antecedent. These contexts
have been termed logophoric (see Sells 1987, Charnavel 2019a, i.a.).
(2) a. The picture of herselfi on the front page of the Times made Maryi’s claims seem some-
what ridiculous. (Pollard and Sag 1992:264)
b. Alberti was never hostile to laymen who couldn’t understand what physicists like himselfi
were trying to prove. (Ross 1970:230)
Causal clauses, adjunct clauses headed by because and since in English, can also contain ex-
empt anaphors. An anaphor in a causal clause can be bound long distance by an antecedent in the
superordinate clause. This is shown in (3). Here, Liz, the matrix subject, can bind the reflexive her-
self residing in the adjunct clause. Charnavel (2019b) argues that causal clauses, like the one in (3),
create perspectival contexts. The causal relation must be established by some reasoning individual,
which we henceforth refer to as the “causal judge.”
Moreover, when an exempt anaphor is licensed in a causal clause, the antecedent must also
believe that the causal relation expressed by the adverbial clause holds. In (3), Liz herself must
believe that the picture going around is the reason she left the party. Compare this to (4), where the
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anaphor has been replaced by a pronoun. Here, Liz may or may not believe the picture going around
to be the cause of her leaving. She may believe the picture had nothing to do with her leaving.
(3) Lizi left the party because there was an embarrassing picture of herselfi going around. (Char-
navel 2018:5)
(4) Lizi left the party because there was an embarrassing picture of heri going around.
As such, Charnavel (2019b) argues that the causal judge is encoded directly in the semantics
for causal subordinators. She gives because constructions the semantics in (5), where j represents
the causal judge, an argument of because (cf. Stephenson 2007).
(5) JA because( j) BKw = ∀w′ compatible with j’s mental state in w, B is the cause of A in w′.
Furthermore, Charnavel (2019b) argues that this causal judge variable is represented syntac-
tically because it is subject to binding requirements. First, it must be bound by a syntactically
represented speaker S (Speas and Tenny 2003, Haegeman and Hill 2013) or some higher attitude
holder. Second—and crucially for our purposes—the judge variable may also be bound by an event
participant in the superordinate clause under the appropriate conditions. As we will see, binding by
an event participant is a necessary condition for the licensing of exempt anaphors in these clauses.
Thus, the judge variable must be bound by Liz in (3) (as in (6a)), but need not be in (4) (as in (6b)).
In both cases in (6) the speaker S binds j, reflecting the fact that the speaker must also believe in the
causal relation expressed by the because-clause.
(6) a. S [Lizi left the party] [ jS+Liz because there was an embarrassing picture of herselfi
going around.]
b. S [Lizi left the party] [ jS because there was an embarrassing picture of heri going
around.]
Additionally, there must be a perspective center for the subordinate clause itself, which is not
necessarily the same as the causal judge. Consider the two continuations of (3) in (7). The speaker
S does bind the causal judge variable, and therefore must also believe the picture going around to
be cause of Liz’s leaving, ruling out the continuation in (7b). The subordinate clause, however, may
have only Liz as the perspective center. Thus the perspective sensitive adjective embarrassing is
being evaluated by Liz alone, and the continuation in (7a) is fine.
(7) Lizi left the party because there was an embarrassing picture of herselfi going around...
a. But I don’t think it was embarrassing at all.
b. #But I think she left because she was tired.
This leads Charnavel (2019b) to argue that in addition to the causal judge there is a logophoric
operator Op in the periphery of the subordinate clause. This operator syntactically represents the
perspective center, binding logophoric elements in the clause. The causal judge, then, may partially
bind Op. This allows Liz to be the perspective center of the subordinate clause in (3).
Thus apparent exempt anaphors are in fact locally bound and abide by Condition A (Charnavel
2019a). The anaphor herself in (6a) is bound locally by Op. Op is (partially) bound by the causal
judge, and the causal judge is in turn bound by Liz, the apparent antecedent of herself. What looks
to be exempt anaphora is really a sequence of local binding relations. This is illustrated by the tree
in Fig. 1. Liz does not directly bind herself, as this would be a violation of Condition A.
This account predicts that exempt anaphors referring to event participants that do not c-command
the causal clause should be unavailable. Charnavel (2019b) argues that evidential and speech act
modifying causal clauses show exactly that. The attachment sites for these clauses is high in the
periphery of the clause, residing in Moodevidential (EvidP) and Moodspeech act (SAP) in (8) be-
low (Cinque 1999, Speas and Tenny 2003, Rutherford 1970, Sæbø 1991). Clauses attaching at these
high positions would no longer be c-commanded by the matrix subject. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
(8) [Moodspeech act (SAP) [Moodevaluative [Moodevidential (EvidP) ... [VP ... ]...]]]
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Figure 1: Apparent exempt anaphora in causal clauses is local binding.
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Figure 2: The causal judge in evidential causal clauses cannot be bound by the matrix subject.
Examples of these types of causal clauses are below in (9). Because speakers report that the
causal subordinator since is preferred in these clauses, we will refer to these as evidential since-
clauses and speech act modifying since-clauses, respectively, in contrast to eventive because-clauses.
(9) a. It must be raining, since/because John’s rain boots are wet. (EvidP)
b. It’s raining, since/?because you need to go out later. (SAP)
Armchair native speaker judgments support this prediction. Evidential and speech act modi-
fying since-clauses disallow exempt anaphors. Compare the eventive causal clause in (3) to (10),
where the embedded clause is understood to provide evidence for the truth of the matrix clause.
(10) ?? Liz must have left, since there is an embarrassing picture of herself going around.
In the next section, we provide experimental evidence supporting this conclusion, bolstering the
analysis in Charnavel (2019b).
3 Experimental Confirmation
We tested experimentally the empirical claim in Charnavel (2019b) that exempt anaphors are per-
missible in eventive because-clauses but not evidential since-clauses. We asked 90 participants to
provide grammaticality judgements of causal clauses containing exempt anaphors on a six-point
Likert scale. Each participant was shown three sentences of because-clauses and since-clauses, like
those in (11). The semantic import of the clause types was controlled for; because-clauses had
eventive interpretations, while since-clauses had evidential ones.
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(11) a. Alice sued the newspaper because it published an embarrassing photo of herself.
[condition mean: 4.7 out of 6; standard deviation: 1.15]
b. Tom went on vacation since there was a picture of himself at a beach on Facebook.
[condition mean: 3.5 out of 6; standard deviation: 1.38]
Using t-tests to calculate the results, we find that participants judged because-clauses with ex-
empt anaphors to be significantly better than since-clauses (p < 0.0005). This supports the claim
that eventive because-clauses allow for exempt anaphora but evidential since-clauses do not.
4 Concessive Clauses
We extend the analysis of exempt anaphora in Charnavel (2019b) to concessive clauses headed by
even though and although. These clauses are a natural extension of the theory of exempt anaphora in
Charnavel (2019b). First, they are argued to be anti-causal semantically, and may therefore parallel
causal clauses syntactically (Ko¨nig and Siemund 2000).1Second, we know relatively little about the
syntax of these clauses.
Rutherford (1970) argues that although-clauses are syntactically higher than even though-clauses,
as although-clauses have speech act modifying uses, but even though-clauses do not. If Rutherford
(1970) is correct that although-clauses attach higher than even though-clauses, we might expect a
contrast similar to that of because and since-clauses. That is, we might expect exempt anaphora to
be available for even though-clauses but not although-clauses. To test this, we performed an exper-
iment like the one outlined in section 3. We found that even though-clauses do allow for exempt
anaphors, but although-clauses do not.
We asked the same participants as in the experiment in section 3 to judge sentences with exempt
anaphors in concessive clauses on a six-point Likert scale. Participants each saw three sentences with
even though-clauses and three sentences of although-clauses. Examples of the sentences tested are in
(12). Both types of clauses were presented as contrasting the two clauses (i.e., the although-clauses
were not to be interpreted as speech act modifiers).
(12) a. The judge was allowed to stay on the case even though there was a recording of himself
insulting the defendant. [condition mean: 4.7 out of 6; standard deviation: 1.19]
b. Mary spent the week at her lake house although there was going to be a statue of herself
revealed outside city hall. [condition mean: 3.8 out of 6; standard deviation: 1.57]
Using t-tests to calculate the results, we found a significant contrast between even though- and
although-clauses in acceptability (p < 0.0005). Even though-clauses containing exempt anaphors
were judged to be significantly better than although-clauses. Comparing concessive clauses to
causal clauses, we found no significant difference between even though-clauses and eventive be-
cause-clauses nor one between although-clauses and since-clauses. The results for the four clause
types are summarized in Fig. 3.
This sheds light on the syntax of concessive clauses. We conclude that, like eventive because-
clauses, even though-clauses may be c-commanded by matrix subjects, allowing for apparent exempt
anaphora. Although-clauses, however, attach higher than the matrix subject, disallowing binding. In
the next section of this paper, we show that even though-clauses are not exactly like because-clauses.
While they attach lower than although-clauses, they attach higher than eventive because-clauses.
5 Even Though Attaches High
These results may suggest that even though-clauses are a syntactic counterpart of eventive because-
clauses. This is not the case. Further syntactic tests reveal that, in certain respects, even though-
1Iten (2005) and Lund (2017) argue against this anti-causal view of concessive clauses. On Charnavel’s
account, exempt anaphora is available in causal clauses because they create perspectival contexts, not because
they are causal per se. Without going too far afield, it is reasonable to assume that the concessive relation,
causal or not, must also be established by a reasoning individual and therefore creates a perspectival context.
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Figure 3: Availability of exempt anaphora in causal and concessive clauses.
clauses pattern with evidential since-clauses, indicating that they are higher than because-clauses.
First, negation may take scope above because-clauses but not even though-clauses. Second, ques-
tions may scope above because-clauses but not even though-clauses. Third, quantifier DPs (QDPs)
in matrix clauses may bind pronouns in because-clauses but not even though-clauses. We support
this last claim experimentally.
5.1 Negation
Eventive because-clauses can fall in the scope of negation, cancelling the inference that the subordi-
nate clause holds (Lakoff 1972, Rutherford 1970, Iatridou 1991, Johnston 1994, i.a.). This is not the
case for evidential since- or even though-clauses. The inference that the subordinate clause is true
holds regardless of the presence of negation in the matrix clause. This is illustrated in (13).
(13) a. Liz didn’t leave because she was tired. (But because she had work the next day.)
6⇒ She was tired. (¬> because)
b. # Liz didn’t leave since her coat wasn’t on the rack.
⇒ Her coat wasn’t on the rack. (*¬> since)
c. # Liz didn’t leave even though she wasn’t tired.
⇒ She wasn’t tired. (*¬> even though)
5.2 Questions
Eventive because-clauses can also fall within the scope of a question. Like with negation, these
configurations also cancel the inference that the subordinate clause holds. Again, this is not the case
for the evidential since and even though-clauses. Like with negation, the subordinate clause must be
true regardless of the presence of a question in the matrix clause, as shown in (14).
(14) a. Did the cowboy ride to town because he wanted to buy a new hat?
6⇒ The cowboy wanted to buy a new hat. (Q > because)
b. Did the cowboy ride to town since his horse is gone?
⇒ The cowboy’s horse is gone. (*Q > since)
c. Did the cowboy ride to town even though he didn’t want to buy a new hat?
⇒ The cowboy didn’t want to buy a new hat. (*Q > even though)
5.3 Pronominal Binding
Finally, matrix quantifier DP subjects can bind pronouns in eventive because-clauses but not evi-
dential since-clauses or even though-clauses. The sentences in (15) can only be true for the given
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contexts if the quantifier binds the pronoun. The pronoun in the since- and even though- clauses
can’t be bound, rendering their respective sentences false.
(15) a. [Context: There are ten guests at the party. Four left, and of them, three left due to
exhaustion.]
Most guests left the party because they were tired. (most > because)
b. [Context: There are ten guests at the party. The speaker has evidence that four left. He
sees that one person’s coat is missing, and that three others’ bikes are gone.]
# Most guests left the party since their bikes are gone. (*most > since)
c. [Context: There are ten guests at the party. Four left, and three of the four were having
a good time but needed to get to bed early.]
#Most guests left the party even though they weren’t tired. (*most > even though)
To test this intuition, we asked participants to give truth value judgements for sentences with
bound pronouns in adjunct clauses, given a particular scenario. Subjects each saw four sentences in
unembedded contexts and four in embedded contexts. Matrix subjects consisted of QDPs headed by
no, and pronominal singular subjects in the subordinate clause were the intended targets of binding,
as in (16). The sentence is interpreted as true on only the bound reading, and not on a referential
reading.
(16) [Situation: Congressmen Smith, Jones, and Johnson hate their jobs. However, they feel a
sense of duty to their citizens and go to work every day for that reason.]
No congressman j goes to work because he j loves his job. [TRUE]
No congressman j goes to work because hek loves his job. [FALSE]
Examples for although and even though-clauses are below.
(17) a. [Situation: Will tried out for the baseball team and his mom approved. Harry also tried
out for the team with his mom’s approval. Johnny tried out for the team too with his
mom’s approval.]
No boy tried out for the baseball team even though his mom protested.
b. [Situation: Lisa makes sure that her three sons take good care of their teeth and makes
the children brush their teeth twice per day. While the boys don’t mind brushing their
teeth, they hate going to the dentist.]
No son hates going to the dentist although his teeth need cleaning.
We found that because-clauses were significantly more likely to be interpreted as true than any
other clause type. These results are summarized in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Availability of pronominal binding in causal and concessive clauses.
This last test leaves us with a puzzle. If even though-clauses allow for exempt anaphora, then
matrix subject antecedents can c-command them. However, the unavailability of binding by QDPs
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suggests that these subjects can’t c-command even though-clauses. We resolve this puzzle in the
next section.
6 Analysis
Even though-clauses represent a syntactic peculiarity. On one hand, they attach higher than eventive
because-clauses, failing to take scope under questions and negation. On the other, unlike although-
clauses and evidential since-clauses, they attach low enough to be c-commanded by referential ma-
trix subjects and allow for exempt anaphora. As an added complication, QDP matrix subjects are
not able to bind into even though-clauses, suggesting they are unable to c-command them.
Our solution to this puzzle has two ingredients. First, we argue that even though-clauses attach
at Epis(temic)P. This puts them above eventive because-clauses, but below evidential since-clauses
and although-clauses. The second ingredient concerns the syntax of subject DPs themselves. Fol-
lowing Beghelli and Stowell (1997) and Kiss (1996), we argue that referential DPs and QDPs take
different scopes. This captures the fact that even though-clauses allow exempt anaphora, but not
binding by QDPs.
6.1 Ingredient 1: EpisP
Given that even though-clauses are syntactically lower than although- and evidential since-clause
but higher than eventive because-clauses, they must attach at an intermediate position between the
two. Following the hierarchy of functional projections (8) above, repeated below in (18), EpisP
provides exactly such an attachment site. It is below EvidP, where evidential since-clauses attach,
and above VP, where eventive because-clauses attach.
(18) [Moodspeech act (SAP) [Moodevaluative [Moodevidential (EvidP) ... [VP ... ]...]]]
We argue that even though-clauses reside here at EpisP. There is a semantic basis for this.
According to Crevels (2000:318), “In the epistemic domain concessive conjunction will mark the
impediment of a belief or a conclusion. [A concessive clause] does not express any factual conflict,
but a conflict between the conclusion and the potential counter argument expressed in the concessive
clause.” In other words, even though-clauses do not express an incompatibility between two facts.
Rather, these clauses signal an incompatibility between what we believe and the conclusions we
generally draw from those beliefs and reality itself.
We support this argument with three additional empirical tests. If even though-clauses attach at
EpisP, they should share empirical properties with epistemic modals and other epistemic elements.
Like epistemic modals, these clauses 1) respect the Epistemic Containment Principle (ECP) (von
Fintel and Iatridou 2003), and 2) may only embed under representational attitude verbs (Anand
and Hacquard 2013). In addition, they take appropriate scope with respect to adjacent adverbial
modifiers (Cinque 1999).
6.1.1 Epistemic Containment Principle
The ECP simply states that quantifiers may not take scope above epistemic modals like must (von
Fintel and Iatridou 2003). This is seen in (19), from von Fintel and Iatridou (2003). In a scenario
where I want to know if our friend Chris is awake or not, my interlocutor can utter (19a) to indicate
that Chris’s light being on allows us to draw the conclusion that he’s awake. If we want to generalize
this to all the students, though, we can’t use (19b). Assuming that the if -clause restricts the modal
and is local to it, the quantifier will be unable to bind the pronoun his. Since it cannot take scope
above must and the if -clause, it cannot c-command the pronoun to bind it.
(19) a. Chris must be awake if his light is on.
b. * Every studentk must be awake if hisk light is on.
We’ve seen this same principle at work with even though-clauses in section 5.3. Like epistemic
modals, quantifiers cannot take scope above even though-clauses to bind pronouns within them.
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6.1.2 Representational Attitudes
Epistemic modals are also restricted in terms of the attitude verbs they may embed under. In par-
ticular, they can only embed under representational attitude verbs like think and know (Anand and
Hacquard 2013). These verbs differ from non-representational attitude verbs like want and wish
in that they directly quantify over information states. Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue that epis-
temics must be supplied information states and may therefore embed under representational attitude
verbs, which supply them, and not non-representational attitude verbs, which do not. This contrast
is illustrated in (20) where have to, construed epistemically, can embed under think but not wish.
(20) a. John thinks that Paul had to be innocent.
b. # John wishes that Paul had to be innocent.
This same contrast is exhibited with even though-clauses. They may embed under representa-
tional attitude verbs but not non-representational attitude verbs. This is shown in (21). If the clause
can be embedded, the inference that the subordinate clause holds should be cancellable. This is
possible under think, as in (21a), but not wish, as in (21b).
(21) a. John thinks that Paul went for a walk even though it’s raining (but it’s not actually
raining)
b. John wishes that Paul would go for a walk even though it’s raining (*but it’s not
actually raining).
6.1.3 Adjacent Modifiers
Finally, it follows that if even though-clauses attach at EpisP, they should take scope above modi-
fiers in lower projections but below those in higher projections. Cinque (1999) posits that EpisP is
sandwiched between EvidP and Moodirrealis. Representative modifiers are allegedly and perhaps,
respectively. To determine their scope relative to the adverbial clause, we test whether they cancel
the entailment of the subordinate clause. This is evident with eventive because-clauses, which scope
low. As shown in (22), both adverbs cancel the entailment that it was a nice day.
(22) Perhaps/allegedly, John went for a walk because it was a nice day.
6⇒ It was a nice day. (Adv. > because)
If even though-clauses attach at EpisP, we should expect allegedly to scope above it and perhaps
to scope below. This is exactly what we find, as shown in (23).
(23) a. Perhaps John went for a walk even though it was raining.
⇒ It was raining. (*perhaps > even though)
b. Allegedly, John went for a walk even though it was raining.
6⇒ It was raining. (allegedly > even though)
In (23b), the adverb allegedly scopes over the even though-clause, cancelling the entailment that
it was raining. This is not true for perhaps, as in (23a), which does not cancel the entailment. This
suggests that even though-clauses attach at a position between the two adverbs, namely EpisP.
6.2 Ingredient 2: DPs and Scope
The behavior of exempt anaphora and quantificational binding with even though-clauses results in a
conundrum. As we have seen, exempt anaphora is available with even though-clauses. Thus matrix
subject antecedents must be able to c-command the even though-clause. On the other hand, QDP
matrix subjects are unable to bind pronouns in even though-clauses. This suggests that QDP matrix
subjects do not c-command even though-clauses. We resolve this apparent problem by adopting the
view that different types of DPs take different scopes.
Different types of DPs exhibit scope asymmetries. For instance, the inverse scope reading of
(24a) is unavailable. However, when the object DP fewer than three girls is replaced by the DP
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every girl, an inverse scope reading is possible. Beghelli and Stowell (1997) argue that asymmetries
of this sort are the result of different fixed scope positions for different QDPs, restricting their scope
possibilities.
(24) a. Two students visited fewer than three girls.
b. Two students visited every girl.
Higher than other QDP scope positions sits RefP, a kind of topic position. Referential (or
specific) DPs may move to the specifier of this position, but QDPs like every student may not (Kiss
1996). We posit that RefP sits between EpisP and EvidP. In the examples of even though-clauses
with exempt anaphors above, the matrix subjects are referential. As such, they may occupy this
high position, allowing them to bind the causal judge in the adverbial clause. Because this position
is below EvidP, these subjects can’t bind the judge in evidential since-clauses. Subject QDPs can
never move to a position higher than the even though-clause, preventing them from binding pronouns
in the subordinate clause.
6.3 Putting it Together
EvidP
RefP
RefP
EpisP
EpisP
TP
DistP
VP
...
(every)
...
t i
...
EpisP◦
...
Ref◦
Lizi
Evid◦
AdvP
... herself ...
OP
j
even though
4
4
4
Figure 5: Even though-clauses at EpisP.
We first argued that even though-clauses occupy EpisP. This puts them between EvidP, where
evidential since-clauses attach, and VP, where eventive because-clauses attach. Following Beghelli
and Stowell (1997) and Kiss (1996), we then argued that referential DPs take scope in RefP, a topic
position higher than EpisP but below EvidP. QDPs take scope below this.
Together, even though-clauses occupy a position higher than eventive because-clauses, nega-
tion, and questions, but below referential DPs. Thus referential DPs can bind the judge variable
in the even though-clause, allowing for exempt anaphora. In addition, other types of DPs can only
move to positions below this, and won’t be able to bind pronouns in the even though-clause. The
full picture is depicted in Fig. 5.
7 Conclusion
This study has several results, both methodological and theoretical. Methodologically, we have
shown that the distribution of exempt anaphora in concert with other scopal tests can be used to
diagnose higher resolution analyses for the syntax of adjunct clauses. Theoretically, we have argued
for a new analysis of the syntax of even though-clauses. We have also provided further support for
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the theory of exempt anaphora presented in Charnavel (2019b), as well as theories of DPs and their
relatives scopes in Beghelli and Stowell (1997) and Kiss (1996).
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